stresses that it is fundamentally a belief or estimation. Castelfranchi and Falcone (1998) extend this deÐnition to include the notion of competence along with predictability.
One way of identifying trustworthiness of other agents is by developing and deploying mechanisms to model other agents. The goal is to predict the behavior of other agents. Building detailed, up-to-date, and accurate models, however, is time-consuming and a potential detractor from actual problemsolving. The model-building process has three components :
as a priori or initial model Recently, agent modeling has received increasing attention from MAS researchers. Several probabilistic mechanisms have been developed to model agents (Sandholm & Crites, 1995 ; Zeng & Sycara, 1997) . Some of these models have been used to explore opponentsÏ strategies (Carmel & Markovitch, 1998 ). An agent using such a mechanism models othersÏ strategies, which in turn, enables it to choose actions to maximize its payo †. Very little work, however, exists on explicitly choosing actions that aid in the modelbuilding process. It is the plan to investigate mechanisms that will allow the modeling agent to choose actions to elicit maximal information from another agent about the latterÏs trustworthiness. This should provide vital information in dealing with the other agents. The use of bayesian networks is proposed to capture the relationships among the agent dispositions and their actions. The modeling agent will use its observations in tandem with its model to update its belief about other agents.
Some of the agent actions may be such that they can extract more information about other agents, though not necessarily producing the highest immediate returns. On the other hand, there may be some other actions that are of immediate beneÐt to the agent but tell little about the other agents. Depending on how signiÐcant and time-constrained the work at hand is, the agent will have to trade o † progress in problem-solving with updating its model of other agents.
To illustrate this tradeo †, a demonstrative example scenario will be used. Consider a situation where an agent A needs some documents that agent B has in its possession. A can either directly ask B to give the document to A, or can ask BÏs boss to instruct B to give the document to A. The Ðrst action of A will deÐnitely provide more information about BÏs dispositions, depending on whether B obliges or not. On the other hand, the second action of A may not reveal BÏs actual cooperativeness, because there is an extra level of uncertainty introduced due to the mediation by BÏs boss. Hence, if B helps, it may be under coercion, whereas if it does not help, it may be because the boss forgot to entertain AÏs request and A may never know that. However, the second action may be more likely to satisfy AÏs immediate goal. If A has to choose between these two actions, it has to tradeo † between the likely immediate gain by choosing the second action, and long-term gain from the information extracted from B by virtue of the Ðrst action. In this case, such additional knowledge is exclusive of high immediate reward, while in some other cases it may be a side e †ect of the selected action.
In this paper, the focus is only on how to discover other agentsÏ nature (in the sense of trustworthiness) and problem-solving for utility maximization is not considered. Bayesian networks can be used to model action.
BAYESIAN NETWORKS
A bayesian network (Jenson, 1996 ; Charniak, 1991 ) is a graphical method of representing relationships, i.e., dependencies and interdependencies among di †erent variables that together deÐne a model of a realworld situation. Technically, it is a directed acyclic graph (DAG) with nodes being the variables and each directed edge representing a dependence between two of them. In addition to its structure, a bayesian network is also speciÐed by a set of parameters q that quantify the network.
Consider a vector X of variables and an instantiation-vector x (that assigns a value to each variable in X from its domain If the imme-
is the vector with its instantiation
When the instantiation is clear from the context, the above is also written as
This deÐnes the joint distribution of the variables in X, where each variable is conditionally independent of its nondescendents given its parents or X i conditioning variables. Bayesian networks are useful in inference from belief structures and observations. For this purpose, an extension of Bayesian networks called inÑuence diagrams is actually considered, which incorporate action and decision nodes besides modeling beliefs. Bayesian networks are used for representing belief structures, for the following major reasons : networks can readily handle incomplete data sets. This is An example bayesian network for a negotiation scenario (Banerjee et al., 1999 ) is shown in Figure 1 to illustrate how agents can use such a network to model others. In this particular example, A wants to sell its car to B, and as the negotiation for the price progresses, A updates its model regarding the factors inÑuencing BÏs decision. In this paper, a similar modeling approach has been assumed, albeit for decision making. 
CHOOSING ACTIONS TO IMPROVE MODELS OF OTHERS
The actions of agents in a multiagent environment can reveal their strategies to others. In most domains, agents are strongly coupled in the sense that the actions of an agent can inÑuence the utility of other agents. In an open environment, a self-interested agent should be aware of the nature, dispositions, and priorities of other agents. Such knowledge can enable an agent to better plan its actions. Hence, in addition to performing its problem-solving tasks, an agents should try to elicit accurate knowledge about agents who can a †ect its utility and with which it frequently interacts. Actions chosen from a particular subset of available actions, or a particular order of the same action set, may reveal more information about the true nature of the agents more e †ectively. Our goal is to develop a mechanism for selecting the actions for the modeler so as to form better estimates of the nature of the others.
The basic approach of eliciting information from or about an agent is as follows. It is contended that often there are actions that give out more information about an agentÏs strategies than other actions. From the modeling agentÏs viewpoint, one wants to recognize the scenarios or contexts that will result in the other agentsÏ choosing actions that reveal more information about their trustworthiness. The modeling agent should then, by its own actions, create the corresponding contexts as often as feasible, and to the extent that these do not signiÐcantly detract from its regular problemsolving activities. One visualizes an information content in each action of an agent and deÐnes it as below. DeÐnition 1. Suppose an agent A has n available action represented { ai} 1 n as nodes in the modeling bayesian network. T hese need not be distinct nodes, but can be the di †erent values of the same node. One considers the subset of parent-nodes of an action node denoted by (i.e., which a i
model the dispositions of an agent like trustworthiness, cooperativeness, etc. T hen information content in action of agent A is given by
One notes that this quantity lies between 0 and 2 1, (see Figure 2 ) with the minimum occurring at maximum uncertainty regarding the possible events. This corresponds to the situation which, in oneÏs view, provides minimum information about the nature of A that B would like to know to improve his model.
The model of agent interaction that one considers is a two-level game (Luce & Rai †a, 1957) , where the modeler (B) has to choose from a set of possible actions which lead to the other agent (A) adopting from its
FIGURE 2. Plot of negative entropy-function, where the case that the probability of all options are equal (here two options) corresponds to minimum information content.
own set of actions. The jth action of agent A in response to the ith action of agent B, is denoted as to be chosen from the set The agent B b i , a ij , { a ij } j 5 1 j 5 n . models the factors that inÑuence AÏs action-choice including its own actions, as a bayesian network. The trustworthiness of A is one of the critical factors that guides AÏs response to BÏs actions. A maximin (Luce & Rai †a, 1957) mechanism is presented that allows B to select actions that help it to form increasingly better estimates of AÏs trustworthiness, given its response to BÏs actions.
The set of actions available to A in response to each action of B are known to B and the latter has prior estimates of the probabilities of factors a †ecting each such action of A. Among these, represents those parents
of the action node that reÑect the nature of A. Now given the prior a ij probabilities of such factors, B computes the information content of AÏs action as a ij
where is computed according to Bayes rule as
and since, in general are all independent of
can also be looked upon as a measure of the di †erence between the prior E ij and posterior probabilities of Now, BÏs goal is to Ðnd the action Ã (a ij ).
b i that has the maximum value for minimum information content across all of AÏs responses to the action i.e., B wants to maximize the minimum guarb i , antee regarding the information obtained from AÏs response to To this b i . end, B Ðrst computes the lower bound on extractable information associated with action as b i
Last, B selects the action that maximizes this lower bound as b i
If the prior probabilities are inaccurate, then with progressive interaction, the modeler improves its estimates of the nature (currently under consideration) of the agent being modeled, choosing actions such that convergence is achieved as rapidly as possible. Finally, when the prior and posteriors converge, the modeler moves on to explore some other traits of the other, following the same process all over again. In addition to arbitrating between conÑicting actions, this procedure also suggests a choice among unrelated actions, as is demonstrated in the following example.
MODELING SCENARIO INVOLVING AGENT TRUSTWORTHINESS
Now the use of the above-mentioned procedure is illustrated with a typical agent-interaction scenario. An example is described where agent B has to select action for elicitation of maximal information about agent AÏs nature. In this case, one considers an agent trustworthy if it responds positively to oneÏs request for help. A negative response (refusal to help) will decrease trust in that agent, in the absence of any defendable reason, e.g., that the agent was busy in something more crucial to its utility. This approach is, however, not limited to a particular deÐnition of trust and can be used for other deÐnitions as well. One only needs a characterization of the sequence of actions according to the deÐnition adopted. In this example (see Figure 3) , agent B has to choose from the following set of actions : 1 helps others with a reasonably high probability and without any comd A pulsion if he is trustworthy or dependable. It is assumed that this information about AÏs nature is of vital importance to B and so (from Figure 3) it can be written as and also as
One assumes that one has prior probabilities of these events (all events are assumed to be binary-valued) from domain knowledge. From these prior beliefs and conditional probabilities, one estimates the posterior beliefs of B regarding the nature of A, i.e., whether A is trustworthy or not.
Illustration of the Action-Selection Procedure
The subnetworks have been shown for each of BÏs available actions in Figures 4, 5, 6 , including the respective conditional-probability tables. One notes that the probability values in the table of Figure 4 have lower values than corresponding elements in Figure 5 wherever the action node of B has true value. This is because of the additional uncertainties that were mentioned earlier. However, the probability values remain identical wherever the action node has false value, because the other inÑuencing factors are common and a †ect AÏs decision alike.
Based on these probability values, B computes the posterior probability of A being trustworthy, given B selects action and A selects action as b 2 a 2 1
where
Consequently, one has Similarly, one calculates the folPr[D| a Here, one Ðnds that the action is the most favored among the actions b 1 available to B. With increasing exploration by B into AÏs trustworthiness, its estimates are going to be better. As B develops more accurate estimates of AÏs trustworthiness, this improved knowledge allows B to be more e †ective in its problem-solving activities. B can also decide to explore other aspects of AÏs nature once an accurate estimate of AÏs trustworthiness has been developed.
CONCLUSION
In this paper, a mechanism has been presented to enable bayesian networks-based modelers to select actions that lead to more accurate models about the nature of another agent. The mechanism involves the use of a maximin procedure for action selection that guarantees a minimum level of improvement in estimation of an agentÏs trustworthiness irrespective of whatever action the latter selects. An illustration has been provided of the working of this procedure with a running example.
The knowledge of another agentÏs nature may be extremely signiÐcant in guiding the modeling agentÏs problem-solving activities, given the open and competitive environment it is situated in. The progress in problem-solving has been ignored and focus has been solely on exploring the nature of the other agents. An expansion on this model is planned to incorporate the problem-solving criterion too, and an indication on how the tradeo † between these two metrics is to be achieved for action selection. This will provide a uniÐed framework by which exploratory actions are incorporated as an integral part of routine problem-solving for achieving the goal of maximizing long-term utility. Work on multiple-level decision-making is also planned where a multilevel tree structure is generated for each action available to an agent.
The maximin action-selection method is conservative in nature. To guarantee a certain improvement in model estimate it can ignore large improvements. This approach is completely justiÐed if the other agent knows that the modeler is trying to improve its model, and is then deliberately trying to take actions to minimize such increases. When such an assumption is untenable, the modeler can choose the action that produces the maximum average improvement. An interesting avenue would be to experimentally evaluate the relative e †ectiveness of the maximin and average metrics to select actions. NOTE stands for the node that can take values 1 a i a ij " j.
